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STATUTORY PROPERTY: IS IT A 
THING? 
Ben France-Hudson* 
Over the last several decades there has been a proliferation of property-type rights created by 
statute, particularly in the environmental management context. A key question has been how to 
approach these rights on a principled basis, particularly where Parliament has been silent about 
their precise nature. One response has been to put a gloss on these rights by classifying them as a 
new category of "statutory property". However, this article suggests that we should recognise that 
these types of rights are private property. This argument is based on the premise that private 
property serves a variety of social goals and not only individualistic ones. As a result, the institution 
of property is flexible enough to cater for the main concern driving this legislative vagueness, which 
flows from the risk that recognising rights as private property may serve to undermine the purpose 
for which property is being employed. This article develops this point with reference to legislation 
setting up individual transferable quota for fish and emissions units for greenhouse gases in New 
Zealand. It argues that the rights used by these schemes, although not explicitly articulated as 
private property, should be treated as such. It suggests that, providing the contours of the right have 
been structured carefully and the boundaries of the right clearly demarcated, it is desirable that the 
law of property fill in any resulting gaps not addressed by the legislation. 
I  INTRODUCTION  
The last several decades have seen a number of property-type rights created by statute, 
particularly in the environmental management context. A key question has been how to approach 
these rights on a principled basis, particularly where Parliament has been silent about the precise 
nature of the right. This is especially pertinent where the right in question has many, or all, of the 
characteristics of private property. In many cases the rights are specifically designed so that the 
holder has the ability to possess, use and transfer them, and the benefits that flow from these powers 
are a prime motivating factor in adopting such a right in the first instance.1 One response has been to 
  
*  Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Otago.  
1  There are at least six characteristics of private property: exclusivity, duration, flexibility, quality (or 
security) of title, transferability and divisibility; see Anthony Scott The Evolution of Resource Property 
Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 6. However, in property law theory the "liberal triad" 
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put a gloss on these rights by classifying them as a new category of property such as "statutory 
property" subject solely to the provisions of the relevant legislation. However, this article suggests 
that such an approach is problematic. The concerns are twofold. First, labelling something as 
"property" but then confining its operation to the text of a particular piece of legislation is likely to 
result in negative outcomes. Where Parliament has been ambiguous, or silent, on a particular issue, 
the courts would have limited recourse to the general law and, in particular, property tools and 
concepts that we recognise as non-controversial and essential to resolving issues regarding the 
ownership, control and use of resources. Essentially, the risk is that in grouping these rights under a 
classification of statutory property we mischaracterise them as something less than what they really 
are. Words have power, and by erroneously restricting their definition to a certain (and impliedly 
lesser) species of property, we run the risk of creating unnecessary complexity in the law, both 
normatively and practically. Calling something statutory property contains an implicit assumption 
that these are somehow not "proper" property, and therefore, less legitimate. This is likely to lead to 
uncertainty and increased costs, but may also result in unintended consequences. Secondly, the 
uncertainties attendant on statutory property and the ambiguity of this type of right more generally 
are likely to have a flow on effect for their security, their attractiveness and value, the extent of 
engagement with the schemes which rely on them and the success of the schemes overall.  
In response, this article argues that it should simply be recognised that these types of rights are 
private property. This argument is based on the premise that private property serves a variety of 
social goals and not only individualistic ones. As a result, the institution of property is flexible 
enough to cater for the main concern driving the legislative vagueness, which flows from the risk 
that recognising rights as private property may serve to undermine the purpose for which property is 
being employed. This is important because recognition that these rights are proprietary would not 
only increase both certainty and efficiency, but would also allow the state the flexibility to closely 
design property regimes which harness the positive benefits that flow from private property while 
also providing for broader social considerations.   
This article begins by discussing Armstrong DLW GMBH v Winnington Networks Ltd,2 which 
not only illustrates the sorts of issues that can arise in this context, but also that ambiguity in the 
characterisation of a particular right can be time-consuming, unnecessarily complex and expensive. 
It then observes that Parliament can, and often does, play an important role in the creation of private 
property before using emissions units under the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) 
and individual transferable quota under the New Zealand quota management system for fish to 
demonstrate that these property-type rights are indeed private property.  
  
powers of possession, use and disposition are often used as a useful shorthand for the key features of private 
property: see Jeremy Waldron The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2012) at 66. 
2  Armstrong DLW GMBH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10, [2013] Ch 156 (Ch). 
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Finally, the article explores the reasons legislatures are often vague regarding the legal nature of 
these rights.  It identifies that the drivers of this ambiguity are anxieties regarding the perceived 
consequences of recognising something as private property. However, a counter-tradition within 
theories of private property, known as the "social obligation norm" provides a principled response to 
these concerns. This idea of private property recognises that property serves social ends and that 
owners are subject to limitations and obligations. In turn, this supports this article's ultimate 
argument, which is that these property-type tools should be explicitly recognised as private property 
and treated as such. Providing careful attention is paid to the structure of the right in the first 
instance, it is totally appropriate that the general law of property fill any gaps.    
II  LOSS IN A CASE OF FRAUD: ARMSTRONG V 
WINNINGTON  
In late January 2010, 250,000 emissions allowances under the European Union emissions 
trading scheme were fraudulently acquired as a result of a phishing attack by six companies in 
Germany. Among the victims was Armstrong DLW GMBH, a company involved in the production 
of linoleum and PVC. Using a fraudulent email, the fraudsters had obtained the username and 
password for Armstrong's account in the German Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Registry. The 
fraudsters then approached another company, Winnington Networks Ltd (which was based in 
England and dealt in technology products), and sold the emissions allowances to it, duly transferring 
the allowances into Winnington's account at the UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Registry. 
Winnington, which it was accepted was not a party to the fraud, traded them on to another party on 
the same day.3 The value of the stolen emissions allowances was over €250,000.  
The resulting case centred on which of the two parties (Armstrong or Winnington) should bear 
the loss of the fraud perpetrated by the third party. Resolution of this issue centred on the legal 
nature of the emission allowances in question. This issue was far from clear-cut. Formally known as 
European Union Allowances, the allowances in this case were a creature of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme. By art 3 of the relevant Directive, an "Allowance" means an allowance to emit one 
tonne of carbon dioxide during a specified period.4 Although allowances are freely transferable in 
accordance with the terms of the Directive and recorded in a register which facilitates trade, the 
scheme is otherwise silent as to the fundamental legal nature of these rights. It followed that the 
judge had to start from first principles in resolving the dispute. He began by noting that the legal 
question at the heart of this dispute was:5    
  
3  At [22].  
4  Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community [2003] OJ L275/32. 
5  Armstrong, above n 2, at [28]. 
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If B steals A's property and sells it to C, does A have a claim against C for the property or its value, and 
if so, what is the legal basis of A's claim and what defences, if any, does C have to such a claim?  
What this suggests is that, notwithstanding the legislative silence about the precise nature of an 
emissions allowance, the law of property would play a decisive role in the dispute. It was ultimately 
accepted by all parties, and the judge, that the relevant emissions allowances were private property. 6 
However, if statutory property is accepted as a distinct class of rights it would not have assisted 
resolution of the matter given the governing legislation, in this case an EU Directive, was effectively 
silent on the legal nature and characteristics of these allowances. In fact, it may have made it more 
difficult to resolve because the judge may have felt unable to resort to orthodox property law tools 
to decide the matter.  
Fortunately, this was not the case as, despite all parties concluding (correctly in my view) that 
the rights were private property, they did not agree about their precise nature and characterisation. 
Winnington argued that, while the emissions allowances were property, they were not a type of 
property that the "common law protects by a relevant cause of action".7 In particular, Winnington 
suggested that there was no common law proprietary claim for property of the sort represented by an 
emissions allowance; such claims being restricted to receipt of land, goods, money and some 
documentary choses in action, but not other forms of intangible property, such as emissions 
allowances.8 
Eventually, the judge decided that the allowances could not be characterised as a chose in action 
in a narrow sense (as they could not be claimed or enforced by action), but, to the extent the concept 
of the chose in action encompasses wider matters of property, they could be described as such. 
Ultimately, the judge concluded that it did not matter whether an emissions allowance was a chose 
in action or merely some other form of intangible property.9 This conclusion opened the door to a 
discussion of both the law of restitution and the law of trusts, and enabled the judge to conclude the 
case in Armstrong's favour by holding that either: 
(1) the fraudster had become a constructive trustee of the emissions allowances in question, 
and that Winnington's degree of knowledge (in particular as a result of deficient behaviour 
in assessing client due diligence information) was enough to make its receipt of the 
allowances unconscionable; or  
  
6  At [31].  
7  At [40]. 
8  At [35]–[40]. 
9  At [61]. 
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(2) if beneficial and legal title to the allowances had not been separated, Winnington was 
sufficiently on notice of potential fraud so as to be liable for a claim for proprietary 
restitution.10 
Without deciding which of these two approaches actually provided the appropriate legal basis 
for compensation, the judge concluded that Armstrong was entitled in principle to a money 
judgment in an appropriate sum.11 Clearly, this is a deeply unsatisfactory result from the point of 
view of the law of obligations and legal principle. However, the case also has wider implications for 
the law of property.  
III  PARLIAMENT AND PROPERTY CREATION 
Armstrong demonstrates that where property-type tools, such as emissions allowances, are 
employed, the clarity of the legislation creating the right will be of crucial importance and can have 
a profound effect on the outcome for private parties. Beyond the simple cost of the litigation 
involved in Armstrong which took on an "unduly convoluted complexion"12 (and would have only 
increased if statutory property was to become a distinct and recognised category on its own) 
legislative ambiguity also has consequences for the security of these rights generally. In particular, it 
is likely to impact on their attractiveness and value, the function of the market created by these 
rights, the expense of engaging with these schemes and their overall success.13  
The emissions allowances in Armstrong are not unique. Since the 1970s there has been a 
proliferation of property-type rights created by statute, particularly in the environmental 
management context. There is nothing unusual or inappropriate about Parliament creating property. 
Indeed, Parliament's role in this sphere is often overlooked. At one end of the scale are legislative 
creations that are clearly proprietary. For example, s 14 of the Copyright Act 1994 succinctly states 
that, "[c]opyright is a property right that exists, in accordance with this Act, in original works". 
Similarly, s 17 of the Patents Act 2013 helpfully states that "[a] patent is personal property" and 
conveniently confirms that "[e]quities in respect of a patent may be enforced in the same way as 
equities in respect of any other personal property". Moreover, the concept of the fee simple owes its 
existence to a piece of legislation called Quia Emptores.14 This legislation prevented tenants from 
  
10  At [273]–[289]. 
11  At [290].  
12  Kelvin FK Low and Jolene Lin "Carbon Credits as EU Like It: Property, Immunity, TragiCO2medy?" 
(2015) 27 JEL 377 at 377.  
13  At 377.  
14  Quia Emptores 1289 (Eng) 18 Edw I c 1.  
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passing their land by subinfeudation, and required all tenants who wished to alienate their land to do 
so by way of substitution.  It remained part of New Zealand's law until 2007.15 
At the other end of the spectrum are instances where Parliament expressly disclaims property 
(although it sometimes does so while conferring some property-like functions on the right involved). 
Perhaps the most infamous example of this is the Resource Management Act 1991 which states in s 
122(1) that resource consents are "neither real nor personal property." While there has been a great 
deal of debate about what this means (and whether it actually means what it says),16 a 2015 Court of 
Appeal case clarified that resource consents do not confer a property right.17 At least as far as water 
permits are concerned, they simply confer the right to carry out the activity under the Act; the right 
to take and use water.  
Between these two extremes are a range of other entitlements, like the emissions allowances in 
Armstrong, where the legislature is unspecific about the nature, extent and limitations of the right. 
These sorts of entitlements cover a range of different activities, extending from environmental 
management tools to address the tragedy of the commons (such as individual transferable quota for 
fishing, transferable water rights or emissions units for managing greenhouse gas emissions) to 
rights to engage in an economic activity such as the production, import or export of a particular 
commodity.18  
A recurring question about these rights is how to approach them on a principled basis. As 
Armstrong demonstrates, the legal classification of the right will have real implications for the 
owner. For example, in the absence of statutory guidance, the simple question of whether the right is 
tangible or intangible property will have an impact in relation to the property torts, the law of equity, 
securities law, insolvency law, governmental confiscation, regulatory adjustment and the rules 
  
15  Although aspects of the rule continue: see the Property Law Act 2007, s 57(3). 
16  Barry Barton "Property Rights Created under Statute in Common Law Legal Systems" in Aileen McHarg 
and others (eds) Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010) 80; Laura Fraser "Property Rights in Environmental Management: The Nature of Resource Consents 
in the Resource Management Act 1991" (2008) 12 NZJEL 145; and David Grinlinton "Evolution, 
Adaptation, and Invention: Property Rights in Natural Resources in a Changing World" in David Grinlinton 
and Prue Taylor (eds) Property Rights and Sustainability: The Evolution of Property Rights to Meet 
Ecological Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden and Boston, 2011) 273. 
17  Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) [2015] NZCA 509, (2015) 18 ELRNZ 
825. 
18  Examples include liquor licences or equivalent, but also tools such as the United Kingdom's former "dairy 
produce quota" which aimed to cap the amount of milk a farmer could sell each year without having to pay 
a levy or pay for a "waste disposal licence" such as that in issue in Re Celtic Extraction Ltd [2001] Ch 475 
(CA). 
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regarding liability, not to mention taxation and accounting treatment.19 Armstrong is not the only 
case where judges have had to grapple with these issues.20  
IV  PROPERTY-TYPE RIGHTS ARE … PRIVATE PROPERTY 
How to approach these "intermediate" rights on a principled basis is the key question 
confronting this area of the law. Rather than categorising them as statutory property the simple 
solution is to recognise that they are actually private property and be explicit about this when 
drafting the relevant legislation. This approach is supported by the fact that close examination of 
these rights suggests that they are proprietary but that the legislative ambiguity is largely driven by 
concerns regarding the perceived operation of private property, and in particular the degree of 
privilege with which it is associated. However, these concerns are alleviated when it is recognised 
that private property serves social purposes beyond catering to the self-interest of individuals. 
Indeed, modern accounts of private property which justify it on the basis of the social purpose it 
serves help to support the argument both that these rights are private property, but also that 
legislatures should be much more explicit about this.  
A  A New Zealand Illustration: Emissions Units and Individual 
Transferable Quota 
Two practical examples help to illustrate the argument that these property-type rights are in fact 
property. These examples also demonstrate that treating these rights as property will not result in a 
range of anticipated and undesirable outcomes, as Parliament has already proscribed the rights in a 
way that avoids these concerns.  
1  The exclusivity of emissions units and individual transferable quota 
It is useful to begin by considering the extent to which emissions units (under the NZ ETS) and 
individual transferable quota under the New Zealand quota management system confer exclusive 
rights on their holders. Focusing on exclusivity is helpful because it is often seen as the key 
characteristic of private property and provides a preliminary test regarding the legal nature of these 
tools.  
The NZ ETS creates and recognises various types of "emissions units". Participants in the 
scheme must surrender to the Crown one unit for each tonne of emissions they have made over the 
  
19  Markus W Gehring and Charlotte Streck "Emissions Trading: Lessons From SOx and NOx Emissions 
Allowance and Credit Systems Legal Nature, Title, Trasfer, and Taxation of Emissions Allowances and 
Credits" (2005) 35 Env't L Rep 10219.  
20  For example, if not addressed by statute, the simple question of whether or not the entitlement is held in 
joint or common tenancy could have very important consequences for the holders of the right: see 
Armstrong v Public Trust [2007] 2 NZ L Rev 859 (HC). The operation of equity and the ability to sever the 
legal and beneficial title is also another question that may need to be determined judicially: see British 
Columbia Packers Ltd v Sparrow (1989) 35 BCLR (2d) 334 (CA).  
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relevant compliance period.21 This obligation underpins the market that has been created and gives 
emissions units both purpose and value. However, the Climate Change Response Act 2002 is almost 
entirely silent as to the legal nature of these units. Although the different types of units are identified 
in the interpretation section (s 4), the Act does not further define their nature.22 However, the effect 
of ss 18C and 7(2) of the Act is to indicate that, with a few narrow exceptions, only account holders 
are able to transfer or otherwise deal with emissions units.23 Thus, the Act appears to confer an 
exclusive right to deal with the units held in the holder's account. Account holders may surrender, 
cancel, retire, transfer and (to a certain extent) use their units as security. Only the holders of the 
units can engage in these activities, which suggests that emissions units are private property because 
they confer on their holder an exclusive right to deal with the units as they see fit.   
Similar observations are true of individual transferable quota under the Fisheries Act 1996. The 
operation of the quota management system is driven by the annual decision of the Minister of 
Fisheries regarding the total allowable catch and the total allowable commercial catch for each 
species of fish managed by the scheme.24 In order to ensure sustainability, the Minister can adjust 
the allowable catch up or down, and he or she may set it at zero.25 As with emissions units, although 
the Fisheries Act 1996 does not explicitly deal with the nature of quota,26 it is clear that quota is 
private property.27 Quota itself is specifically designed to be like other forms of private property28 
  
21  Climate Change Response Act 2002, s 63. 
22  With one exception, the Act uses the term "holder" of an emissions unit and avoids the word "ownership". 
Section 29, however, indicates that a printed search result, or a copy of a printed search result, is receivable 
as evidence of "ownership" of units. It follows that while the Act eschews the language of ownership we can 
accept that a degree of "ownership" is envisaged by the Act. See also: Alastair Cameron "New Zealand 
Emissions Trading Scheme" in Alastair Cameron (ed) Climate Change Law and Policy in New Zealand 
(LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2011) 239 at 269.  
23  At 269. 
24  Fisheries Act 1996, ss 13 and 20.  
25  Section 20(2). 
26  Section 2 of the Fisheries Act 1996, which deals with interpretation, states that individual transferable quota 
is, inter alia, individual transferable quota allocated under ss 44, 47, or 49, or quota that was allocated under 
the Fisheries Act 1983 but that has been converted into quota shares via the operation of s 343. 
27  A point reinforced by New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen v Minister of Fisheries CA82/97, 
22 July 1997 at 16 (see below).   
28  James L Anderson "Property Rights, Fishereis, Aquaculutre, and the Future" in Donald R Leal (ed) Evolving 
Property Rights in Marine Fisheries (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, 2005) 239; Donald R Leal 
"Prologue" in Donald R Leal (ed) Evolving Property Rights in Marine Fisheries (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Oxford, 2005) ix; Donald R Leal "Fencing the Fishery: A Primer on Rights-Based Fishing" in 
Donald R Leal (ed) Evolving Property Rights in Marine Fisheries (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Oxford, 2005) 1; and Rögnvaldur Hannesson "The Privatization of the Oceans" in Donald R Leal (ed) 
Evolving Property Rights in Marine Fisheries (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, 2005) 25.  
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and can be bought, sold, mortgaged and transferred. There is even the ability to place a caveat on the 
quota register.29 While quota does not confer a right to catch a certain number of fish, but rather 
represents the right to a percentage of a total allowable commercial catch,30 it is exclusive in the 
sense that a quota holder's percentage of the catch need not be shared with anybody else. 
2  Private property theory  
The conclusion that emissions units and quota are private property is also supported by broader 
aspects of property law theory. While there is an ongoing debate in property law theory about what 
actually makes property "property",31 taking the robust sort of approach laid down by Lord 
Wilberforce in Ainsworth, it is clear that these rights are "… definable, identifiable by third parties, 
capable in [their] nature of assumption by third parties, and … have some degree of permanence or 
stability".32 In theoretical terms, this approach is echoed by scholars such as Waldron who suggests 
that if a right entitles its holder to possession, use and transfer of a "thing" (to a greater or lesser 
degree) it will amount to a private property right.33 This is certainly true of emissions units and 
quota. It follows that, at least in relation to the triad powers of possession, use and disposition, 
emissions units and quota are private property. Holders of these rights have possession, can use the 
rights, and are able to alienate them.  
3  Judicial opinion  
Further support for the argument that rights such as emissions units and quota are property stems 
from the fact that courts, across a range of jurisdictions, accept that these rights are private property, 
albeit subject to some restrictions and qualifications.34 Two cases serve to demonstrate the point.  
Clearly, Armstrong is a useful example. Essentially, it involved a question regarding liability for 
loss suffered as a result of a trade involving stolen carbon credits. As noted, there was no dispute 
between the parties that the emissions units in question were capable of constituting, and did in fact 
constitute, property as a matter of law. The judge did not object to this position noting that "[w]hat 
is in issue, however, is their precise nature and characterisation as property".35 As noted above, 
  
29  Fisheries Act 1996, pt 8.  
30  Quota is expressed as shares and one share is worth one-hundred-millionth of the total allowable 
commercial catch: Fisheries Act 1996, s 42.  
31  For an excellent review see Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Nigel Bankes "Different Views of the Cathedral: 
The Literature on Property Law Theory" in Aileen McHarg and others (eds) Property and the Law in 
Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 19. 
32  National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) at 1248. 
33  Waldron, above n 1, at 66. 
34  For a further example see IMC Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2009] HCA 51, [2009] 240 CLR 140.  
35  Armstrong, above n 2, at [40]. 
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answering that question was crucial to determining the appropriate basis for liability; something the 
judgment actually leaves clouded.  
A New Zealand example also serves as an excellent illustration of the courts' general approach 
to these types of rights. New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen v Minister of Fisheries 
involved a judicial review of a Ministerial decision to reduce the catch of snapper in a quota 
management area at the top of the North Island by about 39 per cent. Among the heads of review 
was a claim that in doing so the Minister had failed to take into account a legislative intention to 
create "strong property rights" in the quota in question. One of the preliminary arguments in the 
High Court and Court of Appeal was whether or not individual transferable quota is, in fact, 
property.  
In the High Court McGechan J accepted without difficulty that individual transferable quota 
constituted a very important and valuable form of private property right.36 However, contrary to the 
applicants' submission, he held that the property right had qualifications that indicated it was 
subservient to the Minsiter's powers. The quota holder holds it, his Honour suggested, on the basis 
that he or she must take the rough along with the smooth. Moreover, he stressed that while 
"[s]anctity of property has its place in law and society … much depends on the terms of which the 
property is held".37  
In the Court of Appeal Tipping J was even more explicit. His Honour held that it was necessary 
to have regard to the legislation creating the right, and moreover:38  
While quota are undoubtedly a species of property and a valuable one at that, the rights inherent in that 
property are not absolute … . There is no doctrine of which we are aware which says you can have the 
benefit of the advantages inherent in a species of property but do not have to accept the disadvantages 
similarly inherent.   
Each of these cases serves as a useful demonstration that courts accept these entitlements are a 
form of property right, albeit that they may have some peculiarities. Importantly, none of these 
courts had to work very hard to come to this conclusion.  
4  Scholarly opinion 
Completing the argument that these rights are private property is the fact that private property is 
absolutely central to the theory underpinning the use of emissions units and quota. According to this 
theory, market failures, such as over-fishing or climate change, occur as a result of inadequately 
  
36  New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen v Minister of Fisheries HC Wellington CP237/95, 24 
April 1997 at 90. 
37  At 92. 
38  New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen, above n 27, at 16.  
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specified private property rights.39 It follows that completely specifying property rights in a 
resource should result in environmental problems being solved.40 Structuring an environmental 
management scheme around private property should lead to the "best" or "most efficient" use of 
natural resources and do so in a way that rationally secures long-term sustainability.41 Individual 
transferable quota schemes and emissions trading are the poster children of this movement and 
clearly demonstrate the practical application of the theory. The key thing to note about these tools is 
that they essentially involve privatising the former commons and this entails giving some form of 
ownership interest to those using the resource.42 The aim is to establish a market, which is 
completely reliant on private property.  
It follows that the literature also starts from the premise that these rights, employed to solve the 
tragedy of the commons,43 are proprietary in nature.44 As Carol Rose has observed, property has 
always been seen as a solution to the tragedy of the commons, and attempts to employ this idea in 
the context of air pollution and greenhouse gases reflect the standard idea that property rights can 
encourage conservation. As she points out "all these schemes reflect a standard idea in property: that 
is, property rights can encourage careful resource management and conservation".45 It is the 
"property-like" characteristics of these rights that are "at the heart of their attractiveness".46 She 
describes these rights as a form of "hybrid-property" and in doing so her goal seems to be to 
recognise that these tools owe their existence to the state, although she is quick to point out that this 
is also true for a large amount of otherwise uncontroversial property such as intellectual property 
and corporate securities. However, in using the term "hybrid-property" Rose is not denying that 
  
39  See the origin of this view in Garrett Hardin "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 162 Science 1243. 
Similar points can be made in relation to instruments such as import or production licences, but they are 
beyond the scope of this article.  
40  Paul Martin and Miriam Verbeek "Property Rights and Property Responsibility" in Catherine Mobbs and 
Ken Moore (eds) Property: Rights and Responsibilities Current Australian Thinking (Land & Water 
Australia, Canberra, 2002) 1 at 2.  
41  Gerd Winter "The Climate is No Commodity: Taking Stock of the Emissions Trading System" (2010) 22 
JEL 1 at 16.  
42  John Hasnas "Two Theories of Environmental Regulation" (2009) 26(2) Social Philosophy and Policy 95 at 
98.  
43  Hardin, above n 39. 
44  See for example Terry L Anderson and Donald R Leal Free Market Environmentalism (Westview Press, 
Boulder (Colorado), 1991) at 3. 
45  Carol M Rose "The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and 
Ecosystems" (1998) 83 Minn L Rev 129 at 166.  
46  Carol M Rose "Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection: Comparing 
Community-Based Management to Tradable Environmental Allowances" in Elinor Ostrom and others (eds) 
The Drama of the Commons (National Academy Press, Washington DC, 2002) 233 at 235. 
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these tools are a form of private property. Rather she is simply attempting to identify the role of the 
state in their creation. Moreover, as she later observes, a number of concerns about using the 
language of private property in relation to these tools stems from the "rhetoric and mentality of 
entitlement"47 that often accompanies it, which can drive an unwillingness to specifically 
acknowledge the rights are private property simpliciter and instead characterise them as something 
that implicitly indicates that they are a lesser, and more confined, species of right. 
V  LEGISLATIVE AMBIGUITY; DRIVEN BY ANXIETY  
This final point is crucial. Assuming that these rights are private property as it is commonly 
understood (a position which is supported by theory, judicial authority and academic comment), 
what explains the fact that their legal nature is not addressed in the legislation that creates them? 
There is clearly no problem with creating private property through legislation as this happens 
frequently. What is unclear, however, is what makes these rights different. The answer lies in Rose's 
observation that the concerns about using the language of private property in relation to these tools 
stems from the associated notion of entitlement. Barton has also noted this, observing that ideas of 
property have "dangerous strength in environmental and natural resources law".48  
There is a range of relevant concerns. Many, if not all, stem from the perception that once 
something is called or recognised as property, a range of consequences will follow. In particular, the 
concerns are driven by the dominant account of private property within the Western tradition which 
celebrates individual autonomy and functions to elevate individual self-interest over the needs of the 
community. The fear is that calling something "property" will engage this perception, which may 
lead to a range of unintended consequences.   
Two brief examples help to illustrate this point. First, it is likely that policymakers are well 
aware that if an entitlement is seen as proprietary, if it is changed in some way or "taken away" by 
the state, then there is an expectation that compensation will be paid.49 Clearly, keeping the 
contours of a right vague will make this sort of argument more difficult to run. The problem with 
this, however, is that it can become very difficult to determine what, if any, attributes of property 
attach to an entitlement in any given set of circumstances.50 The potentially unintended 
consequence of this, is that by attempting to avoid the financial risks associated with compensation 
it becomes difficult for the law to evolve in a way that minimises complexity. This will inevitably 
increase costs for all of those involved, as well as impacting on the potential success of the regimes 
overall.  
  
47  Rose, above n 45, at 172.  
48  Barton, above n 16, at 99.  
49  See Geoffrey Palmer "Westco Lagan v AG" [2001] NZLJ 163 at 168. 
50  Barton, above n 16. 
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A second and related concern can be described as the risk of "path-dependency" in the sense that 
adaptation and flexibility in response to changing information can become very difficult because of 
prior institutional choice. In theory, using private property to manage natural resources requires 
restricting the use of a resource to a level that is compatible with the sustainability of the whole 
complex network or ecosystem in which the resource is embedded. To achieve the goals of resource 
conservation, it will also require a large degree of flexibility in order to adjust to changing 
information and policy priorities. If these rights are expressly seen as private property there is a 
perceived risk that the operation of private property and its focus on insulating the desires of the 
individual from the needs of the community and ecosystem may limit the degree of flexibility 
available. Keeping the nature of the right ambiguous ostensibly allows decision makers a degree of 
leeway which might be impeded if such rights were explicitly property. One response in this area 
has been to suggest that these entitlements should be categorised as a new form of "statutory 
property".51 This species of property would be solely governed by the rules contained in the statute 
that created it and not subject to the general rules and statutes dealing with real or personal property. 
In this way, the concerns surrounding the privileged conceptions of property can be addressed and 
flexibility maintained, while also recognising that these entitlements are, at the very least, a form of 
hybrid property. 
VI  SOCIAL OBLIGATION ADDRESSES THE CONCERNS  
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that in this sphere the perception is not matched 
by the reality, and these concerns and responses rely on an idea of property which, although 
dominant, does not tell the full story. Close examination of the Western property law tradition 
indicates that there has never been a time where the interests of the individual were invariably able 
to trump those of the community. A counter-tradition within property law makes it clear that in 
reality, private property is a social institution that serves an intrinsically social function. This 
counter-tradition helps to explain why emissions units and quota can be private property while also 
avoiding some of the traditional concerns associated with its use.   
Although this counter-tradition is evident in analysis of private property dating back to ancient 
times, its modern articulation is relatively recent.52 There is a range of different names for this idea, 
however, the one that is generally accepted is the "social obligation norm" of property.53 In essence, 
it suggests that society expects a private property regime to fulfil primarily social goals, not 
  
51  Grinlinton, above n 16, at 296.  
52  Carol M Rose Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership 
(Westview Press, Boulder (Colorado), 1994); and Gregory S Alexander Commodity and Propriety: 
Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought 1776–1970 (The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1997). 
53  Gregory S Alexander "The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law" (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 
745.  
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individual ones. It recognises that humans are social creatures whose individual autonomy is 
enabled by their social nature and the communities in which they live. On this approach, the core 
purpose of private property is to secure sufficient property to individuals in order to allow them to 
flourish. Only if the individual can flourish, can autonomous participation in a well-functioning 
society be enabled.54 This fact tempers the scope of the individual's ability to use his or her property 
solely as he or she wishes and recognises that sometimes individuals owe obligations to the 
community in relation to the resources they control.55  
The crucial aspect of these observations is that the norm is inherent in what it means to own 
property.56 Consequently, restrictions or limitations on the ways in which property can be used, or 
on the contours of the right, are not the imposition of external duties on an owner. Rather, they are 
simply the identification of a restriction that is already extant within the property right itself. The 
mechanism may be normative, judicial or legislative, but in any case a change or constraint in how 
the right may be deployed is the concrete expression of a central feature of the private property right 
itself. It follows that the social obligation norm of property provides a principled explanation for the 
fact that owners of property have obligations to the community generally.57 
The presence of the social obligation norm within the idea of property not only provides a 
principled basis on which to account for the structure of emissions units and quota, but also 
demonstrates that the institution of property is flexible enough to cater for the main concerns driving 
the legislative vagueness in relation to these property type rights. It follows that it is not necessary to 
articulate these rights as unique; as a species of "statutory property" limited to the words of the 
legislation. Instead, we can simply accept that they are private property and be clear about that. It is 
not a given that use of property will lead to the negative consequences feared by many as it is 
possible to structure private property regimes to achieve a range of predictable and desired ends.  
Evidence of the social obligation norm in operation is provided by both the NZ ETS and the 
quota management system for fish. For example, although predicated on the idea that creating a 
private property in a resource will provide an incentive to look after it, the NZ ETS does not actually 
do this. Rather, it creates a property right that can be used to discharge a liability; the right does not 
  
54  Alexander, above n 53; Gregory S Alexander "The Complex Core of Property" (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 
106; Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo M Peñalver "Properties of Community" (2009) 10 Theo Inq L 127; 
Gregory S Alexander "Pluralism and Property" (2011) 80 Fordham L Rev 1017; Sheila R Foster and Daniel 
Bonilla "Symposium: The Social Function of Property: A Comparative Law Perspective: Introduction" 
(2011) 80 Fordham L Rev 1003; and Colin Crawford "The Social Function of Property and the Human 
Capacity to Flourish" (2012) 80 Fordham L Rev 1089.  
55  Alexander and Peñalver, above n 54.  
56  Gregory S Alexander "Ownership and Obligations: The Human Flourishing Theory of Property" (2013) 43 
HKLJ 451 at 453.  
57  At 453. 
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actually grant its holder an interest in either greenhouse gases or the atmosphere. If a participant 
does emit a tonne of carbon dioxide they are liable to surrender one emissions unit.58 Failure to do 
so can lead to criminal sanctions and a financial penalty of $30 for each unit that ought to have been 
surrendered.59 Consequently, it is not possible to even roughly equate the ownership of an emissions 
unit with ownership of the atmosphere or the actual carbon or other greenhouse gases. The fact that 
the primary use of an emission unit is to escape a liability severs any relationship between the 
property right and the resource.60 This is important because it suggests that the framers have 
managed to use private property in a way that mitigates the concerns surrounding its use. This 
structure insulates the Crown from criticism if it changes the regulations surrounding emitting 
activities because unit holders cannot argue that rule changes will illegitimately interfere with their 
private property rights. Their rights are limited and do not represent an interest in a resource that can 
be "taken away" by regulation. This avoids both the risk of path-dependency, but also the concern 
that any changes to the scheme may need to be accompanied by compensation.  
It is difficult to see that the position would be any different if emissions units were specifically 
articulated as private property. The Crown's powers and protections would not be diminished. 
However, in the case of fraud under the NZ ETS, clearly articulating emissions units as property 
would have the happy effect of avoiding the problems that arose in Armstrong by eliminating the 
need to have a preliminary argument regarding the legal nature of emissions units. There is nothing 
in the Climate Change Response Act 2002 which addresses the situation that arose in Armstrong. In 
the case of fraud, there will be questions regarding who should bear the loss. Unless Parliament was 
minded to address this question, or provide a scheme of compensation similar to that under the Land 
Transfer Act 1952, resolution of such an issue would have to be addressed by the common law or 
equity. While specific recognition of an emission unit as private property would not mean that the 
answer in any particular case would necessarily become clear-cut, it does help to provide some 
certainty regarding the area of law which will govern the outcome. Not only would this increase the 
certainty needed for investment and a successfully functioning scheme, but it can also be important 
in assessing, and advising on, the available remedies if the matter is brought to court. While 
completely avoiding the types of arguments presented in Armstrong (for example, whether 
emissions allowances were a chose in action or something else) would require detailed legislative 
drafting, generally speaking, recognising these rights as private property would help to reduce the 
complexity and cost of any litigation and would not expose the Crown to any actions which would 
interfere with the function of the scheme. 
  
58  Climate Change Response Act 2002, s 63.  
59  Sections 132 and 134.  
60  For a full analysis see Ben France-Hudson "No Property Rights in the Atmosphere" in Paul Martin and 
others (eds) In Search of Environmental Justice (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2015) 105.    
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Similar observations are true in relation to individual transferable quota. Although it is private 
property, quota does not provide a strong or unattenuated property right in a particular resource. 
While quota provides an exclusive right, it is not in the fish themselves, but rather in co-ownership 
with the other holders. Quota holders are still in competition with each other for the actual fish and 
there are no guarantees that they will land them. Thus, the scheme of the Fisheries Act 1996 and in 
particular the fact the Minister has the power to set and adjust the total allowable catch, reflects the 
community's interest in having a sustainably managed fishery; but none of this would be different if 
quota were articulated as private property. The structure of quota insulates the Crown from claims 
for compensation or objections regarding regulatory taking, in the same way as for emissions units. 
Thus, concerns about path-dependency and compensation are overstated. While the Fisheries Act 
1996 specifically addresses the problem that arose in Armstrong61 the legislation does not appear to 
cater for every eventuality. For example, it does not specify whether quota held by more than one 
person is held jointly or in common. This may be important where one party dies, particularly for a 
right that can commonly be held by families.62 While specifically stating that quota are property 
will not resolve all of these issues, it will make them simpler to assess in the first instance and 
provide some certainty to right holders about the nature of their entitlements.  
It is clear that the concerns surrounding the legislative vagueness regarding emissions units and 
quota are adequately addressed by the fundamental structure of each right. Emissions units provide 
the ability to discharge a liability that occurs as a result of engaging in emitting activities. 
Recognition of this right as property will not impede the Crown's ability to govern and regulate the 
regime itself. Nor will any changes in the number of emissions units in circulation (a drop in the 
cap) result in any claim for compensation. Likewise, quota reflect a share of a total catch, not an 
interest in fish. The key environmental decisions, and in particular the requirement to achieve 
sustainability63 are engaged in the decisions regarding the appropriate level of catch. As the catch 
can go up and down, there is no risk that recognising quota as specifically proprietary will  result in 
an inability to achieve this aim and there is also no risk that a reduction in catch will result in a 
successful claim for compensation.64  
It follows that the architects of these rights have done a good job of balancing the tension 
between utility of private property in this area and some of the associated concerns. The reason for 
this success lies in the fact that, contrary to popular belief, private property is not solely about 
individual preference satisfaction, the protection of individuals from illegitimate governmental 
  
61  Quota differs from emissions units in that it is backed by a Crown guarantee of title, which is drafted in 
similar terms to that found in the Land Transfer Act 1952. See the Fisheries Act 1996, ss 168–173. 
62  Other issues might concern equity and the law of trusts, temporal assignment and rules on forfeiture.  
63  Fisheries Act 1996, s 8.  
64  As illustrated by New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen, above n 27.   
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interference and an increase in aggregate social wealth. The reality is that these rights demonstrate 
that the tradition of private property is actually plural and that a "thing" can be proprietary while still 
carving out room within its contours for the needs of the community.   
VII  CONCLUSION  
Armstrong was heard at the Royal Courts of Justice over five full days. The reported judgment is 
293 paragraphs and 64 pages long. "Unduly convoluted"65 is perhaps a polite way of describing 
what should have been a relatively straight-forward dispute determining who should bear the loss in 
a case of fraud. This complexity stems from the failure of the relevant legislation to define the legal 
nature of the emissions allowances in question. The same ambiguity can be seen in relation to the 
NZ ETS and the New Zealand quota management scheme.   
However, this legislative ambiguity is unnecessary and does the rights, and us, a disservice, as 
does the suggestion that they should be treated as a distinct class of statutory property. We are 
employing these tools because we want to utilise the really beneficial aspects of private property and 
the investment and ingenuity it encourages. These tools are designed to look like property, they 
behave like property and judges and academics accept that they are property. The concerns that lead 
to the vague articulation of these rights are driven by an idea of property centred on the satisfaction 
of individual preferences and the protection of the individual from illegitimate governmental 
interference. There is a risk that, taken to its logical conclusion, this idea of private property could 
result in adverse path-dependency and the risk of expensive claims for compensation. However, 
these concerns overlook the fact that this idea of property is not the only one at work. Recognising 
that private property actually serves social ends and that owners are subject to limitations and 
obligations regarding what they own provides a principled basis by which to explain the structure of 
these rights, but also addresses the concerns underpinning the poor articulation of these rights in the 
legislation.  
It follows that we should be upfront and both recognise that these property-type tools are private 
property and be much clearer about this when drafting legislation. This is preferable to trying to 
classify these rights as "statutory property" and confining their operation solely to the text of the 
legislation creating them. Such an approach is unworkable. It is impossible for the legislature to 
think of everything, and relying solely on a single statute with no recourse to the general law results 
in the real risk that the law of unintended consequences will make an appearance. This could not 
only increase uncertainty and costs in relation to the practical operation of a particular right, but also 
make it extremely difficult to reconcile the operation of private property as a legal concept across 
similar rights occurring in dissimilar situations. The idea of property should be consistent and based 
on a cogent set of principles that allow for disputes to be settled in a consistent manner. 
  
65  Low and Lin, above n 12, at 377. 
428 (2016) 47 VUWLR 
Statutory property should not be seen as a thing, but rather, providing the contours of the right 
have been structured carefully and the boundaries of the right clearly demarcated, it is completely 
desirable that the law of property fill in gaps not addressed by the legislation. Not only will this 
increase the certainty and efficacy of these new regimes, but it will also allow for the state to clearly 
provide the incentives necessary to engage the benefits of private property while defining the 
contours of these rights in light of social interdependence and the obligations this imposes. 
